The Criticism Dilemma in International Organizations
Under contract with Oxford University Press
The book offers the first comprehensive study of how international organizations (IOs) deal with criticism from their employees. It shows that the internal “criticism culture” is an overlooked but crucial variable in explaining why many IOs fail to learn, often leading to dire mistakes and serious consequences. The central argument of the book is that these learning deficits result from the criticism dilemma that IOs face. While they need internal criticism to learn, they cannot (and must not) fully leverage this resource. On the one hand, internal criticism—pointing out mistakes, challenging outdated assumptions, introducing new ideas—is necessary for organizational learning. An internal culture that suppresses and discourages such criticism is therefore dysfunctional, compromising the official IO learning infrastructure (logic of learning). On the other hand, repressive and discouraging criticism cultures are also a functional organizational response to the particular challenges IOs face. They preserve internal cohesion and external reputation, enabling IOs to act in an environment full of contradictions (logic of survival). The book explains this criticism dilemma theoretically, shows how IOs deal with it empirically, and provides suggestions for managing it practically.
Building on insights from organization theory and sociological-institutionalist IO research, the book analyzes the criticism cultures in three IOs: the United Nations (UN) Secretariat, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The empirical analysis draws on 90 in-depth interviews with staff and senior managers conducted in New York, Rome, and Geneva, as well as extensive analysis of documents. It shows that institutional learning tools in these IOs are ineffective because staff often do not dare to voice criticism, and critical documents are glossed over as they move up the ranks. This hinders organizational learning, weakens IO performance, and causes frustration and cynicism among IO staff. Yet the analysis equally demonstrates that there are good reasons for how internal dissent is treated, especially in IOs that depend strongly on member states in contexts of high public pressure, contradictory and highly normative mandates, and rigid hierarchical structures. Lastly, the three case studies also reveal that “criticism from within” is possible despite these difficult conditions. Some IO employees manage to make their criticism heard through creative detours. Overall, the book provides a new perspective on the conditions of organizational learning in IOs, offers new insights into the origins and effects of bureaucratic dysfunctions, and contributes to the growing literature on the agency of IO staff.